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ADJUDICATING THE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF AN ASYLUM SEEKER: WHEN THE 
“WELL-FOUNDED FEAR” STANDARD LEADS COURTS ASTRAY 
Maritza Black* 
 This note discusses the standard that should be applied for asylum 
seekers who are fleeing religious persecution in their home country. In order 
to gain asylum in the United States, applicants must meet the standard of a 
refugee, meaning that, among other things, they must demonstrate that they 
have a well-founded fear of returning to their country of origin.1 
Well-founded fear has been defined as when the applicant has a 
“subjectively genuine and an objectively reasonable fear.”2 The subjective 
fear is established when an applicant is found to have testified credibly 
concerning their fear of return. The objective standard is more difficult to 
define but has been likened to the reasonable person standard, when “a 
reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution” upon return 
to the native country.3 This standard is inconsistent with the way in which 
other religious legal issues are typically addressed, and becomes impossible 
to apply when an individual fears religious persecution such as black magic, 
voodoo, or witchcraft that is incompatible with the Western perspective of a 
reasonable fear. Evaluating another culture’s religious beliefs through the 
lens of a reasonable person standard results in blanket discrimination 
against non-Western ideologies.  
The Supreme Court’s long-standing approach to determining an 
individual’s religious beliefs is that it is only appropriate to determine the 
sincerity of the belief, not the underlying veracity of the belief itself.4 The 
same standard should be applied towards asylum seekers whose fear of 
returning to their home country is rooted in their religious beliefs.  
                                                            
* 2019-2020 Executive Managing Editor, Concordia Law Review; J.D. 2020, Concordia 
University School of Law. 
1 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A) (2014). 
2 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1987); Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937 
F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1991). 
3 In re Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987). 
4 See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following situations of three Nigerian asylum seekers: 
1. Adija learned that her husband belongs to the Ogboni, a secret society 
believed to have supernatural powers. As part of his initiation he must 
give up a family member chosen by the Ogboni to be the victim of 
human sacrifice. The Ogboni have chosen Adija and she believes that 
if she does not willingly allow herself to be sacrificed, the Ogboni 
will kill her anyway. She is presenting her testimony before the 
immigration judge, and when asked why she is afraid to return to 
Nigeria she explains that her life is in danger there because the Ogboni 
can kill her by merely touching her. 
2. Adebisi fled Nigeria after his father was murdered, making him next-
in-line to become the chief of the Esubete. He refused this role 
because the inauguration process involved allowing the Esubete 
elders to perform a religious ritual on him that will subject him to their 
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control, giving them the power to kill him through the use of voodoo. 
When the immigration judge asks if he went to the police, he explains 
that he did not because he was cursed, and if he reported anything to 
the police the curse would cause him to die.5  
3. Edionseri sought refuge in the United States after he was ostracized 
by his community in Nigeria due to his foul odor that led the 
community to believe he was demonic. He believes that the odor is 
caused by the demons that possess him. During his testimony, he 
describes his troubled life: a wizard killed his father when he was a 
teenager, the devil sent a wizard to transform him into a false prophet, 
and he suffered an eye injury after a spirit threw glass into his eye.6 
Although at first glance it appears that these applicants’ asylum 
claims would be based on religious persecution, their claims would likely 
instead fall under the category of membership in a particular social group, 
because their fear is not that they will be persecuted on account of their 
religious beliefs, but because of their social situations. For example, Adija 
fears persecution because she belongs to a specific societal group family 
members chosen by the Ogboni for sacrifice, not because of her religious 
beliefs themselves. 
Even though these asylum seekers are not claiming a fear of 
persecution on account of their religion, the well-founded fear standard that 
is used for adjudicating asylum claims will cause them to face issues of 
religious discrimination during the adjudication of their asylum claims, 
resulting in a high likelihood that their claims will be denied. The topic of 
this note presents a potential remedy for this issue by presenting an alternative 
to the current standard that mitigates the potential for religious 
discrimination. 
Under the current standard, the immigration judge will adjudicate 
these claims by evaluating whether the asylum seekers’ fears are objectively 
reasonable.7 This determination will then be used to decide whether they 
must return to their home countries. Because this determination comes early 
                                                            
5 Hypothetical based on facts from Adebisi v. INS, 952 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1992) (denying 
asylum based on applicants failure to establish a well-founded fear of persecution).  
6 Hypothetical based on facts from Edionseri v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 1101, 1104 (8th Cir. 
2017) (denying applicant’s claim to asylum because “the word ‘persecution’ in the governing 
statute does not include harms inflicted by supernatural forces or beings”). 
7 IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK, 785 (16TH ED. 2016). 
194             CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW                                     Vol. 5 
 
in the adjudication process, it maintains a gatekeeping function that prevents 
the judge from having to adjudicate the messier aspects of asylum claims, 
such as the category or nexus elements of the claimed fear. 
Ideally, in making the determination of whether a fear is objectively 
reasonable the judge would look at a wealth of information, including 
research on the cultural, social, and religious norms in the applicants’ home 
country, to determine how a reasonable person in the applicants’ situation 
would act. In reality, due to restraints on time and resources, the immigration 
judge will likely make the decision based on the applicant’s testimony alone, 
leaving a wake of uncertainty concerning what standard the judge is using to 
determine what is considered to be an objectively reasonable fear.8  
Why are immigration judges making decisions about the objective 
reasonableness of an individual’s belief? The answer lies within the complex 
history of asylum law, in a standard that was left unclear to allow the courts 
to control the asylum process by creating their own tests.9 Although the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has attempted to clarify the issue by 
establishing a specific, two-prong test, there remains confusion about the 
manner in which this test should be applied.10 
This note argues that the current approach adopted by the BIA 
requiring immigration judges to analyze a person’s religious beliefs through 
the lens of a reasonable person raises constitutional concerns and creates a 
litany of problems such as inconsistencies between circuit courts and the 
manifestation of cultural bias. Additionally, properly determining the test 
presented in the objective prong of the current standard would require an 
abundance of time and resources, which are already in short supply in 
immigration court.  
This note then presents a potential solution to these problems: the 
adoption of the rule presented by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Ballard that prohibits the Court from making an inquiry into the veracity of 
the individual’s religious belief, instead only permitting an inquiry into 
whether or not the belief is sincerely held (hereinafter referred to as the 
                                                            
8 See, e.g., Musa v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 1019 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding the immigration judge 
erred by not finding for applicant due to lack of evidence because the applicant’s credible 
testimony alone is sufficient).  
9 Craig B. Mousin, Standing with the Persecuted: Adjudicating Religious Asylum Claims 
After the Enactment of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 2003 BYU L. REV. 
541, 574 (2003). 
10 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987). 
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Ballard standard).11 The Ballard standard should be applied in place of the 
objective reasonable person standard when an asylum seeker is claiming a 
fear based on a religious belief.  
Part I of this note will give a brief overview of the elements an 
individual must show in order to be granted asylum, focusing on the history 
of the well-founded fear standard. The current evidentiary standard in asylum 
law will also be discussed to give context to how evaluating an applicant’s 
credibility plays a key role in the asylum adjudication process. Part II will 
present the current standard articulated by the BIA for determining whether 
an individual’s fear is well-founded, look at the issues it has caused when 
adjudicating asylum claims, and examine the constitutionality of this 
standard. Part III will present the solution of adopting the Ballard standard 
and explain how the proposed standard would remedy the issues raised by the 
current standard and ensure that asylum seekers’ claims are evaluated in a 
constitutional and consistent manner. Finally, this note will conclude by 
exemplifying how the proposed standard would increase impartiality and 
eliminate cultural bias when adjudicating asylum claims by applying the 
proposed standards to the hypotheticals given above.   
I. SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES–EVIDENTIARY STANDARD AND 
THE ELEMENT OF WELL-FOUNDED FEAR 
When an applicant presents a case for asylum, the burden is on the 
applicant to show that he or she meets the definition of a refugee, defined as: 
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's 
nationality….[and] who is unable or unwilling to return to, 
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion. 12 
This definition of a refugee is the backbone of all asylum claims. 
Asylum applicants must show that they meet this definition before they can 
                                                            
11 322 U.S. 78, 88 (1944) (“[W]e conclude that the District Court ruled properly when it 
withheld from the jury all questions concerning the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs or 
doctrines of respondents.”). 
12 8 USC § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2014). 
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be granted asylum, regardless of whether they are applying for affirmative or 
defensive asylum.13 The applicant also must be able to provide credible 
testimony, because the testimony itself is often the only form of evidence 
offered to the immigration judge.14 This is permitted due to the lower 
evidentiary standard found in immigration courts because applicants seeking 
asylum have fled their country of origin with little to no possessions and 
cannot be expected to retrieve traditional forms of evidence such as medical 
records, police reports, or witness testimony.15 The immigration judge’s 
finding of an applicant’s credibility allows the judge to admit or deny the 
applicant’s subjective perceived beliefs when adjudicating asylum claims.  
In addition to providing the definition of a refugee, the Refugee Act 
of 1980 also established a new procedure for granting asylum.16 One of the 
primary goals of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to bring the United States into 
compliance with the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.17 Indeed, the refugee definition mirrors that of the United Nations 
Protocol (but notably adds the language of well-founded fear).18 The Refugee 
                                                            
13 8 USC § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2008) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney 
General may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum . . . .”). This note will not 
distinguish between affirmative and defense asylum because there is only a procedural 
difference between the two. For an in-depth analysis on the difference between the two 
processes, see Asylum in the United States, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (May 14, 2018), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/asylum-united-states. 
14 8 C.F.R. §208.13(a) (2019); see also Urgen v. Holder, 768 F.3d 269, 272–73 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(reversing the BIA’s decision for failure to accept applicant’s testimony alone, instructing 
that there is no requirement for additional non-testamentary evidence). 
15 In re Barrera, 19 I&N Dec. 837, 845 (1989) (“The alien's own testimony may in some 
cases be the only evidence available, and it can suffice where the testimony is believable, 
consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis 
for his fear.”). 
16 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.). For an overview of the 1980 Refugee Act, see Arnold H. Leibowitz, 
Global Refugee Problem: U.S. and World Response, 467 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. AND SOC. 
SCI. 163, 164 (1983) (“The act was significant in four respects: It established a federal policy 
of continuing refugee admissions; it redefined the term ‘refugee’ to incorporate the 
international U.N. Convention definition, it established the principle of asylum in U.S. 
statutory law; and it established the principle of resettlement assistance for refugees.”). 
17 See Edward M. Kennedy, The Refugee Act of 1980, 15 Int. Migration Rev. 141, 143 
(1981).     
18 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 
6577, Art. 1(2) (defining refugee as one who “owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
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Act also served to eliminate bias previously found in the asylum process by 
removing the prior ideological and geographical limitations.19 
Although the addition of a definition for refugees was one of the most 
significant portions of the Refugee Act, the definition itself is vague, 
impliedly to give greater leeway to immigration judges. This is because the 
definition only determines who is eligible for asylum—the ultimate decision 
to grant asylum lies with the Attorney General.20 The vagueness of the 
definition allowed the courts to create their own definitions for the terms used 
within the definition of a refugee, including well-founded fear, persecution, 
and particular social group.21 This has created a number of inconsistencies 
among the circuit courts that impact how asylum claims are adjudicated. For 
example, the lack of a clear definition of persecution led the Ninth Circuit to 
define persecution as “the infliction of suffering or harm…in a way regarded 
as offensive,”22 while the Seventh Circuit adopted a more stringent standard, 
holding that “the behavior in question must threaten death, imprisonment, or 
the infliction of substantial harm or suffering.”23 The disparity between the 
courts contributes to the issue of forum shopping, where applicants physically 
move in order to be in a more favorable jurisdiction.24 
There also has been confusion due to the conflation of terms used in 
the definition of a refugee and those used in withholding of removal. Thus, it 
is important to note that this definition of a refugee only applies to asylees 
and is not considered when seeking alternative means of relief such as 
withholding of removal.25 For example, in 1984 the Supreme Court had to 
                                                            
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”). 
19 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
20 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 444–45 (1987) (“[A]lthough Congress could have 
crafted a narrower definition, it chose to authorize the Attorney General to determine which, 
if any, eligible refugees should be denied asylum.”). 
21 Craig B. Mousin, Standing with the Persecuted: Adjudicating Religious Asylum Claims 
After the Enactment of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 2003 BYU L. REV. 
541, 574 (2003), see also Joni L. Andrioff, Proving the Existence of Persecution in Asylum 
and Withholding Claims, 62 CHI. KENT L. REV. 107, 107 (1985).  
22 Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969). 
23 Sharif v. INS, 87 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 1996). 
24 See, e.g., Jason Ullman, Kadri v. Mukasey: A Legal Blueprint for Extending Asylum to 
Homosexual Aliens Who Have Not Suffered Physical Persecution, 18 LAW & SEXUALITY: 
REV. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 197, 207–208 (2009). 
25 The primary different between asylum and withholding of removal is that asylum is a 
discretionary form of relief while withholding of removal is mandatory. Additionally, there 
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clarify that the well-founded fear standard in asylum is distinct from the 
clear-probability standard found in withholding of removal, holding that 
Congress intended the definition of refugee to be broader for withholding of 
removal should be narrower because it is a mandatory form of relief.26  
A. Defining What Is a “Particular Social Group” 
The area of particular social group, with which this note primarily 
deals, is one of the most complex areas of asylum law. The term was first 
defined by the BIA in Matter of Acosta as membership in a group that is based 
on immutable characteristics; meaning characteristics that a person cannot, or 
should not be require to, change.27 This definition was adopted by almost 
every circuit.28 However, in 2008 the BIA added new requirements for 
proving membership in a particular social group: the group must also be 
“socially visible” and “particularly defined.”29 These terms were not given 
clear definitions, but instead were explained with additional vague 
restrictions: “particular” was defined as a group that was not “too 
amorphous,” and one society would recognize as a “discrete class of 
persons.”30 “Socially visible” was not explained beyond equating it to a group 
that is generally “recognizable by others in the community.”31 
The particular social group category tends be to utilized as catch-all 
category for applicants that are fleeing persecution not encompassed by the 
areas of race, religion, political opinion, or nationality. For example, the 
asylum seekers from the above hypotheticals would seek asylum based on 
membership in a particular social group because they are fleeing persecution 
due to how they are perceived by others in their communities: Adiji from 
those who believe she should be a human sacrifice, Adebesi from those who 
believe he should be chief, and Edionseri from those who believe he is 
                                                            
is a one-year filing deadline in which most applicants must file for asylum within one year 
of entering the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2019).  
26 INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425–30 (1984). 
27 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), overruled on other grounds. 
28 See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (l0th Cir. 2005); Castellano-Chacon v. 
INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546–48 (6th Cir. 2003); Mya Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 
1998); Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239–40 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
29 In re S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008); In re E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 591, 594 
(BIA 2008). 
30 S-E-G-, 25 I&N Dec. at 584. 
31 Id. at 586. 
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possessed by demons. Although these claims appear to be based on religion, 
it is important to distinguish that the religious beliefs relate to the applicants 
fear, not necessarily to the reason they are being persecuted—the on account 
of portion of the refugee definition. In order to determine the applicants’ 
eligibility, their fear will have to be evaluated using the well-founded fear 
standard, meaning that the court will conduct an analysis on their religious 
beliefs in the same manner that any other fear would be evaluated.  
B. The History of What is Considered to be a “Well-Founded Fear” 
Similar to the lack of consistency between the circuit court’s 
definitions of persecution and particular social group, there has also been an 
inconsistent standard for what constitutes a “well-founded fear.”32 In 1987, 
the Supreme Court recognized that “well-founded fear” was a vague term that 
could “only be given concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case 
adjudication”, but refrained from describing how the well-founded fear test 
should be applied.33 The Court did, however, mention a number of sources 
available to guide the interpretation of a well-founded fear, such as the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (“The UNHCR 
Handbook”).34 The UNHCR Handbook defines “well-founded fear” as when 
an applicant can “establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in 
his country of origin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in 
the definition, or would for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned 
there.”35 The Court also cites to several scholars who have weighed in on the 
matter.36 Out of these scholars, there seems to be a focus on a real chance of 
persecution, which predicts the objective prong later outlined by the BIA.37   
                                                            
32 See Mary McGee Light, The Well-Founded Fear Standard in Refugee Asylum: Will It Still 
Provide Hope for the Oppressed, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 789, 791 (1997) (“[The well-founded 
fear standard] is fraught with problems. The standard's vagueness is a source of conflict 
between the INS and courts.”). 
33 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987). 
34 Id. at 468 n.22 (1987) (recognizing this source as useful; however, mentioning that the 
source is not binding). 
35 Ch. II B(2)(a) § 42. 
36 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 468 n.24. 
37 See, e.g., A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 181 
(1966) (defining “well-founded fear” as when there is “a real chance that he will suffer 
persecution”). 
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Ultimately, the only decision from the Supreme Court that 
specifically addressed the meaning of the well-founded fear standard was the 
1987 decision INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, which rejected the BIA’s holding 
that well-founded fear was essentially the same as a clear probability of 
harm.38 In Cardoza-Fonseca the BIA had affirmed an immigration judge’s 
holding that the respondent, a Nicaraguan citizen seeking asylum on account 
of political opinion after her brother had been tortured and put into prison, 
had failed to show a “clear probability” that she would be persecuted upon 
returning to Nicaragua.39 The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding that distinguished between the clear probability standard and finding 
that an applicant had a well-founded fear.40 However, like in INS v. Luz 
Marina Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court declined to provide a 
definition for well-founded fear, instead leaving it up to the BIA to create a 
new standard for how well-founded fear asylum claims should be 
adjudicated.41 
II. THE CURRENT STANDARD – “WELL-FOUNDED FEAR” & RELIGIOUS 
DISCRIMINATION 
After the Supreme Court’s decision rejecting the BIA’s interpretation 
of well-founded fear, the BIA readdressed the issue in Matter of Mogharrabi 
to determine whether an Iranian fleeing political persecution had a well-
founded fear of returning to his country after he was threatened by 
government officials.42 The BIA once again attempted to reconcile the 
incongruent standards used in the circuit courts and create a uniform test for 
determining whether an applicant’s fear is well-founded.43 To do this, the 
BIA adopted the well-founded fear test that was being used in the Fifth 
Circuit.44 This is the standard that is still used today when an applicant is 
                                                            
38 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 421 (rejecting the BIA’s holding in Matter of Acosta, 19 
I&N Dec. 211, 229 that the “’clear probability standard’ and the well-founded fear standard’ 
are not meaningfully different and, in practical application, converge”). 
39 Id. at 423–424. 
40 Id. at 448.  
41 Id. at 448–449 (“We do not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the ‘well-
founded fear’ test should be applied.”). 
42 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). 
43 In re Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987). 
44 Id. at 443–45 (“We agree with and adopt the general approach set forth by the Fifth Circuit; 
that is, that an applicant for asylum has established a well-founded fear if he shows that a 
reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution.”). 
2020                         ADJUDICATING RELIGIOUS BELIEFS  201 
 
claiming fear of future persecution.45   
The BIA’s well-founded fear test consists of two prongs: the 
subjective prong and the objective prong.46 The subjective prong presents the 
easier test: it is met when an applicant testifies credibly that they are afraid.47 
This prong is easily satisfied because the immigration judge has likely 
already made a finding of the applicant’s credibility by the time this stage of 
the asylum adjudication process is reached. Each immigration judge makes a 
finding of credibility early on in the adjudication process in order to accept 
or deny the applicant’s testimony as evidence.48  
The objective prong presents a higher standard: the applicant must 
show that “a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear 
persecution.”49 Both prongs must be met in order for an applicant to be 
granted asylum.50 It is worth noting that even though the second prong is 
described by the Court as objective, in reality both prongs are highly 
subjective determinations. In order for a judge to determine that an 
applicant’s fear is reasonable, the judge must make a subjective 
determination of what other people would fear, and whether that fear is 
reasonable. 
Even though the two-pronged well-founded fear test resolved the 
issue of which standard should be applied, there remained confusion about 
how the objective prong should be analyzed. The BIA expounded on this 
issue in Matter of Barrera, two years after the well-founded fear standard 
was adopted.51 In this case, the BIA recognized that there were disparate 
approaches among the circuits regarding the objective prong of the well-
                                                            
45 This test only applies when the applicant is claiming fear of future persecution but cannot 
show past persecution, because past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of future 
persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i); see also Duarte de Guinac v. INA, 179 F.3d 1156, 
1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 
46 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1987); Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937 
F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1991). 
47 Cuadras v. INS, 910 F.2d 567, 570–71 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 
830 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
48 See, e.g., In re A-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 1106 (BIA 1998) (“[I]t is also well established that 
because the Immigration Judge has the advantage of observing the alien as the alien testifies, 
the Board accords deference to the Immigration Judge's findings concerning credibility and 
credibility-related issues.”). 
49 In re Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987). 
50 See, e.g., Jorgji v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding that an applicant who 
feared persecution after witnessing executions many years ago had a subjective but not an 
objective basis for fear). 
51 19 I&N Dec. 837, 845 (BIA 1989). 
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founded fear test, and reemphasized that the BIA was adopting the 
“reasonable person standard” of the Fifth Circuit, describing it as a “common 
sense framework” for evaluating an asylum seeker’s claims.52  The BIA also 
specified that “a reasonable person may well fear persecution even where its 
likelihood [of persecution] is significantly less than clearly probable.”53 As 
stated in Moghrrabi, the “reasonable person” is a person in similar 
circumstances to the applicant, and courts are encouraged to look at how other 
applicants in the asylum seekers situations have been treated in their home 
country.54 
 But how is an immigration judge to determine what a reasonable 
person in the applicant’s position would fear? What evidence is permitted, 
and who raises the evidence: the applicant or the prosecuting attorney? What 
factors are taken in account when creating a theoretical reasonable person in 
the same position of the applicant? Are issues of class, wealth, social status, 
religious background, and personal beliefs considered? Is it a reasonable 
person from the applicant’s home country or the exact town of origin? Or 
could it be a reasonable American if the American were placed in the 
applicant’s position? 
There is little direct guidance on any of the ambiguity arising from 
the reasonable person standard beyond the Supreme Court’s holding that as 
little as a 10% chance of future persecution may be enough to create a 
reasonable fear.55 The circuit courts have also failed to clarify these issues, 
though some have tried to elaborate on how the standard should be applied. 
The Second Circuit, for example, held that when evaluating the reasonable 
person standard “the board should be sensitive to the position into which the 
person is, hypothetically, being placed,” but failed to define what “being 
sensitive” entails.56 The First Circuit followed precedent stating that the 
                                                            
52  Id. (“The meaning of the term well-founded fear has been the subject of considerable 
controversy and litigation.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
53 Id. 
54 In re Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. at 446 (“Where the country at issue in an asylum case has 
a history of persecuting people in circumstances similar to the asylum applicant's, careful 
consideration should be given to that fact in assessing the applicant's claims.”). 
55 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (“There is simply no room in the 
United Nations’ definition for concluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance 
of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no well-founded fear of 
the event happening.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
56 Carcmamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 68 (2nd Cir. 1986) (“What is relevant is the fear a 
reasonable person would have, keeping in mind the context of a reasonable person who is 
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objective prong must be “nestled on a plausible factual predicate.”57 Beyond 
these scarce examples, there is an utter lack of clarification on how the 
“reasonable person” should be interpreted. In an immigration court system 
that is already fraught with procedural concerns, this ambiguity is worrisome.  
The problems exacerbated by the ambiguity of the well-founded fear 
standard are critical to address because they coincide with weak points in the 
immigration court system. The discrepancy between courts, the lack of 
sufficient time and resources, and judicial bias are all negatively affected by 
the lack of a clear standard for adjudicating the well-founded fear element of 
asylum claims.  
Immigration courts present some of the most severe inconsistencies 
between jurisdictions, with wide discrepancies occurring among immigration 
courts and the immigration judges themselves.58 The discrepancies between 
the courts can partially be attributed to the disparate rulings that are passed 
down from circuit courts, which are binding for immigration judges.59 The 
lack of uniformity in the asylum adjudication process contributes to the lack 
of consistency across immigration courts. Deciding the objective prong of an 
applicant’s well-founded fear is a good example of this: even cases with 
similar fact patterns reach radically different results. Take, for example, the 
issue of asylum seekers who have family members who stayed behind in the 
applicant’s country of origin. In Hernandez v. INS, the Ninth Circuit held that 
an asylum seeker fleeing El Salvador because he feared he would be 
                                                            
facing the possibility of persecution, perhaps including a loss of freedom or even, in some 
cases, the loss of life.”). 
57 Orelien v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Michel v. Mukasey, 287 
Fed. Appx. 893 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Orelien v. Gonzalez to dismiss applicant’s fears of 
being persecuted by former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s supporters as “unreasonable” 
and therefore lacking well-founded fear). 
58See Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts FY 2013 2018, SYRACUSE 
U.,https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2018/denialrates.html (last visited Mar. 6, 
2020) (showing asylum grant rates varying from 1.2%  to 92% depending on the location 
and judge); see also Rosenburg et. al, They Fled Danger at Home to Make a High-Stakes Bet 
on U.S. Immigration Courts , REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2017, 7:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-immigration-asylum-specialreport/special-report-they-fled-danger-for-a-high-
stakes-bet-on-u-s-immigration-courts-idUSKBN1CM1UG (“An immigrant’s chance of 
being allowed to stay in the United States depends largely on who hears the case and where 
it is heard.”). 
59 Id. (“Immigration courts in California and the Pacific Northwest fall under the 9th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and they rule in favor of immigrants far more often than courts in 
the 4th Circuit, which includes North and South Carolina, Maryland and Virginia, Reuters 
found.”). 
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assassinated by ex-guerillas for his military service had an objectively 
reasonable fear even though his family remained safely in El Salvador.60 
Three years later, in Garcia v. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit denied 
an asylum seeker’s claim of well-founded fear based on death threats he 
received for his work to “reintegrate youth from the guerilla forces into 
society,” in part because “the fact that several members of Luis's family 
continue to live in Colombia suggests that Luis's subjective fear of future 
persecution is not objectively reasonable.”61  
These cases highlight the inconsistent application of the well-founded 
fear standard, because neither of these cases explains what information is 
being used to determine what a reasonable person would fear.62 No discussion 
is made of what a reasonable El Salvadoran veteran fleeing ex-guerillas or a 
reasonable social worker from Colombia would fear, discussion that would 
be of critical importance if the true reasonable person standard were 
applied.63  
Perhaps because of the inconsistencies in applying the objective 
prong of the well-founded fear standard, many courts appear to ignore the 
reasonable person language altogether. Instead, many courts have interpreted 
the objective prong as a means of including outside evidence, such as the 
Department of State Country Reports, in order to refute the applicant’s 
testimony. In 2009 the Tenth Circuit Court found that a homosexual Brazilian 
man had failed to demonstrate an objectively reasonable claim to asylum, 
referring to a Ministry of Health report to refute the applicant’s claim on 
grounds that “[t]he unvarnished fact that 180 homosexuals were killed in one 
year is not remarkable in a country of over 180 million . . . .”64 The Eighth 
Circuit Court also employed this approach in Reyes-Morales v. Gonzalez, 
where the judge rejected the claim of an asylum seeker who was fleeing El 
Salvador due to the civil war violence and tensions between the military and 
guerillas.65 The case was rejected because the State Department Country 
                                                            
60 Hernandez v. INS, No. 00–70920.I & NS No. A72–174–709, 2002 WL 661712, *1 (9th 
Cir. Apr. 22, 2002) (“The continuing safety of Hernandez's immediate family is irrelevant to 
this case.”). 
61 Garcia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 04–16396, 2005 WL 2141527, *1–7 (11th Cir. Sep. 7, 
2005). 
62 Hernandez, 2002 WL 661712, at *1 ; Garcia, 2005 WL 2141527, at *7. 
63 See Hernandez, 2002 WL 661712, at *1 ; Garcia, 2005 WL 2141527, at *1. 
64 Halmenschlager v. Holder, 331 Fed. Appx. 612, 616 (10th Cir. 2009). 
65 435 F.3d 937, 942 (8th Cir. 2006). 
2020                         ADJUDICATING RELIGIOUS BELIEFS  205 
 
Conditions report introduced evidence that the civil war in El Salvador had 
abated, which, the court held, “provide[d] substantial record evidence to 
demonstrate that he did not have an objectively reasonable fear of future 
persecution.”66 
When courts reject an asylum claim based on the applicant’s failure 
to meet the objective prong of the well-founded fear standard but fail to 
analyze the applicant’s claim under the reasonable person standard, one can 
only conclude that judges are determining what they themselves deem to be 
reasonable.67 This is particularly worrisome because immigration judges 
appear to be more heavily influenced by their individual biases, and the 
history and design of immigration courts has created conditions in which 
prejudice and bias seem to run rampant.68 Discrepancies between individual 
judges have been attributed to personal characteristics such as gender, career 
history, and the length of time spent serving as a judge.69 These discrepancies 
can be mitigated through the implementation of consistent standards that 
reduce the number of purely discretional decisions.   
Immigration courts often receive criticism for overt and implicit 
biases that appear more frequently than in other courts. For example, in 
Benslimane v. Gonzalez, Judge Posner lists numerous cases in which the 
Seventh Circuit sharply rebuked the immigration court for “inappropriate 
                                                            
66 Id. 
67 Id.; Ossa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 656 Fed. Appx. 455, 457 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding that 
applicant failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear of persecution because she “failed 
to show she could not avoid the persecution by relocating within Colombia”); Granados v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 578 Fed. Appx. 866 (11th Cir. 2014) (denying applicant’s claim based on 
an inability to prove an objectively reasonable fear, but making no mention of the reasonable 
person standard); but see Cardona Toro v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 371 Fed. Appx. 279, 283 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (denying a claim based on a failure to show an objectively reasonable fear—“there 
is substantial record evidence supporting the conclusion that a reasonable person in 
Cardona's circumstances would not fear future persecution in Colombia”). 
68 Jeffrey S. Chase, The Immigration Court: Issues and Solutions, JEFFREY S. CHASE 
OPINIONS / ANALYSIS   ON   IMMIGRATION   LAW   (March  28,  2019),   https://www.jeffreys 
chase.com/blog/2019/3/28/i6el1do6l5p443u1nkf8vwr28dv9qi; see also TESS HELLGREN ET. 
AL, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S JUDGES: HOW THE U.S. IMMIGRATION COURTS BECAME A 
DEPORTATION TOOL 10 (2019) (“Judicial bias is rampant within the immigration court 
system, with immigration judges across the country failing to provide fair, neutral, and 
consistent adjudication. Radical variations in case outcomes across the country demonstrate 
that courts are failing to apply immigration law in an impartial and uniform way.”). 
69 Rosenburg et al., supra note 59. (“The Reuters analysis also found that an immigration 
judge’s particular characteristics and situation can affect outcomes. Men are more likely than 
women to order deportation, as are judges who have worked as ICE prosecutors. The longer 
a judge has been serving, the more likely that judge is to grant asylum.”). 
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comments”; “the tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the 
[immigration judge]”; and “hostile and extraordinarily abusive conduct”, 
concluding that “the adjudication of these cases at the administrative level 
has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”70 Reprimanding 
immigration judges is certainly not limited to the Seventh Circuit. In one 
Third Circuit court case Judge Fuentes remarked that:  
Time and time again, we have cautioned immigration judges 
against making intemperate or humiliating remarks during 
immigration proceedings. Three times this year we have had 
to admonish immigration judges who failed to treat the asylum 
applicants in their court with the appropriate respect and 
consideration.71 
Finally, immigration judges’ ability to make informed decisions has 
eroded under the pressure of the current administration to process cases as 
quickly as possible. This pressure is further increased by the high number of 
cases backlogging the court system and a decreased amount of time and 
resources available to the judge when deciding a case.72 Efforts to remove the 
backlog have resulted in the imposition of quotas on immigration judges, 
forcing them to adjudicate hundreds of removal cases every year.73 Further, 
budget limitations have left immigration judges without adequate resources 
such as law clerks, of which there is currently only one available for 
approximately every four immigration judges.74 This lack of time and 
                                                            
70 430 F.3d 828, 829–30 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 610 (7th 
Cir. 2005); Qun Wang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005); Fiadjoe v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
71 Wang v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 267 (3d Cir. 2005). 
72 Nick Miroff et al., Burgeoning Court Backlog of More Than 850,000 Cases Undercuts 
Trump Immigration Agenda, WASH. POST (May 1, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/immigration/burgeoning-court-backlog-of-more-than-850000-cases-undercuts-trump-
immigration-agenda/2019/05/01/09c0b84a-6b69-11e9-a66d-a82d3f3d96d5_story.html? 
noredirect=on; see Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC Immigration, 
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2020) (noting 
975,298 cases pending in 2019).  
73 Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, As Immigration Court Quotas Go Into Effect, Many Call For 
Reform,  IMMIGRATION  IMPACT  (Oct. 1, 2019),  http://immigrationimpact.com/2018/10/01/ 
immigration-court-quotas-call-reform/# (“On October 1, immigration judges around the 
country will arrive at work and face a daunting new task; complete 700 removal cases in the 
next year or risk official sanction.”) [hereinafter Melnick].  
74 Andrew R. Arthur, The Massive Increase in the Immigration Court Backlog, Its Causes, 
and Solutions, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD., July 2017, at 4. 
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resources means that standards requiring intensive amounts of research and 
consideration are ill-suited for immigration court. Reducing objective 
standards that require careful consideration of outside circumstances, such as 
what would be considered reasonable in a country with which the judge is 
unfamiliar, and instead focusing specifically on the applicant’s situation 
would make better use of the limited time judges have to decide asylum cases.  
These issues in the immigration court system must be addressed 
before asylum seekers can be guaranteed a trial before an impartial tribunal.75 
The lack of guidelines for adjudicating asylum claims has further opened the 
door for prejudice and bias in immigration courts, because ambiguity erodes 
the necessary checks in place to curb discrimination by making it more 
difficult to determine whether a judge was allowing his or her individual bias 
to cloud the decision. Without a clear, consistent standard, the circuit courts 
will continue to develop different standards for determining what is 
reasonable, worsening the already severe inconsistencies between the 
circuits.76 These inconsistencies between the courts are problematic because 
they incentivize negative behavior such as forum shopping, and reduce the 
chances of asylum seekers’ access to a fair trial.77  
Allowing immigration judges to determine whether a fear is one that 
a reasonable person would fear increases their already expansive discretion 
with little guidance as to what the standard ought to be. Instead of giving 
immigration judges more discretion, clearer guidelines should be established 
so that there is a more consistent standard and a lower chance of abuse. 
While Congress has taken steps to try to resolve these issues, in order 
to be truly effective they must be addressed from an internal standpoint: by 
                                                            
75 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. See, e.g., Caitlin Dickerson, How 
U.S. Immigration Judges Battle Their Own Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/05/us/us-immigration-judges-bias.html (“More than 250 
federal immigration judges attended a mandatory anti-bias training session in August, and 
this summer, the Justice Department announced that 28,000 more employees would go 
through a similar exercise.”). 
76 Even Immigration Judges have commented on the worrying inconsistencies between the 
Circuit Courts. See, e.g., Dias-Rivas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 17-14847, 2019 WL 1755642, 
*17 (11th Cir. Apr. 18, 2019) (Jordan, J., dissenting) (“In my view, Ms. Diaz-Rivas’ 
statistics—showing that from 2014 through 2016 asylum applicants outside of Atlanta’s 
immigration court were approximately 23 times more likely to succeed than asylum 
applicants in Atlanta—are disquieting and merit further inquiry by the BIA.”). 
77 For a greater discussion of the issues created by forum shopping, see Markus Petsche, 
What's Wrong with Forum Shopping? An Attempt to Identify and Assess the Real Issues of a 
Controversial Practice, 45 INT’L. LAW. 903, 1005–28 (2011). 
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ensuring that there are consistent standards within asylum law that encourage 
immigration judges to apply the law in a uniform, fair manner. Taking away 
the objective reasonable person standard and instead adopting a consistent 
standard for analyzing religious beliefs in asylum law would greatly improve 
the discrepancy, bias, and inefficiency of immigration courts.  
However, even if a consistent standard were to be developed—as the 
BIA attempted to do in Matter of Mogharrabi—there remain constitutional 
concerns in analyzing the reasonableness of an individual’s religious belief. 
As discussed below, case law is clear that the judiciary is not the appropriate 
forum for religious decisions, especially when the decision turns on the actual 
beliefs of the individual.78 Allowing immigration judges to determine 
whether an applicant’s fear that stems from his or her religious belief is 
reasonable in essence allows the immigration judge to decide whether the 
individual’s religious belief is true, an idea that is contrary to all other 
religious-based decisions in the American court system. 
III. THE SOLUTION – THE STANDARD PRESENTED IN UNITED STATES V. 
BALLARD SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN PLACE OF THE OBJECTIVE PRONG OF 
THE “WELL-FOUNDED FEAR” TEST IN ORDER TO PROPERLY ADJUDICATE 
ASYLUM CLAIMS 
In 1944 the Supreme Court decided a keystone case for religious 
freedom: United States v. Ballard.79 Although the subject matter of the case 
was fairly mundane—the defendants were convicted of mail fraud after 
distributing religious pamphlets—the holding from this case became one of 
the most important tenets of constitutional law. In Ballard, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s instructions to the jury to determine only 
whether the defendant’s beliefs were in “good faith,” and not to examine the 
truth or validity of the beliefs themselves.80 Even though at first blush the 
holding from Ballard appeared to be applicable in a very limited setting, 
decades of case law following Ballard affirm and expand on this rule, 
                                                            
78 For additional scholarship concerning whether judges should have any authority to make 
religious-based determinations, see Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Questions” 
Doctrine? Judicial Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U.L. 
REV. 497 (2005) [hereinafter Goldstein]. 
79 322 U.S. 78 (1944).  
80 Id. at 88. 
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creating what many scholars view as a broad ban on any inquiry into religious 
doctrine.81  
Part of the expansion of the Ballard standard includes a clear 
prohibition on analyzing the centrality or importance of religious beliefs. In 
Hernandez v. Commissioner, a 1989 tax law case concerning whether the 
Church of Scientology should be allowed tax deductions for mandated 
training sessions, the Supreme Court refused to analyze whether a belief was 
central to the plaintiff’s religion, stating:  
The free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed 
a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious 
belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling 
governmental interest justifies the burden. It is not within the 
judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or 
practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' 
interpretations of those creeds.82 
This generous interpretation of the Ballard standard was affirmed in 
Employment Division v. Smith when the Court found it to be constitutionally 
impermissible to make factual inquiries into religious doctrines or practices:  
What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to 
contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is 
“central” to his personal faith? Judging the centrality of 
different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable 
“business of evaluating the relative merits of differing 
religious claims” . . . Repeatedly and in many different 
contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to 
determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the 
plausibility of a religious claim.83 
The Ballard standard is not limited to cases that deal directly with 
infringements on an individual’s ability to practice their religion. It has been 
consistently applied across the legal system, including to administrative law 
such as tax decisions where the Ballard standard has been referenced as a 
                                                            
81 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 78.  
82 Hernandez v. Comm’r., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). 
83 Emp’t Div., Dep’t Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (citing United States 
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
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guideline for the IRS when determining whether a deduction may be made 
for various religious donations.84 It has been emphasized that no matter how 
unconventional or bizarre, the court may not “deconstruct” an individual’s 
belief system.85  
The United States has clearly placed a high value on freedom of 
religion, and considers freedom of religion to be a fundamental right86, so it 
is not surprising that courts have gone to such great lengths to protect it.87 
The Ballard standard promotes freedom of religion by shielding religious 
practitioners from inappropriate judicial interference that would occur if 
judges were permitted to analyze the substantive content of their beliefs.88 
A. The Application of the Ballard Standard in Immigration Court 
Given that the Ballard standard has been generously interpreted and 
is the bedrock for protecting freedom of religion, the question arises: Why is 
it not being applied to asylum seekers? Although asylum seekers are not 
entitled to the full range of constitutional rights as U.S. citizens, they are still 
protected under the Freedom of Religion Clause of the Constitution.89 
                                                            
84 See, e.g., Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 693 (“Given that, under the First Amendment, the IRS 
can reject otherwise valid claims of religious benefit only on the ground that a taxpayers' 
alleged beliefs are not sincerely held, but not on the ground that such beliefs are inherently 
irreligious . . .”) (citing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)). 
85 Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale, Inc., 311 F.Supp.2d 190, 191 (“While its tenets may be 
viewed by some as unconventional, or even bizarre, the respect afforded by our laws to 
individual conscience, particularly in regard to religious beliefs, puts any deconstruction of 
the Church's doctrine beyond the purview of the court.”). 
86 See, e.g., EEOC v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, 
30 F.Supp.2d 217, 225 (“Freedom to exercise one's religion lies at the core of our nation's 
fundamental rights.”); see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“Freedom 
of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men.”). 
87 22 U.S.C. §§ 6401–6481 (2000) (known as the “IFRA,” the International Religious 
Freedom Act was enacted to promote freedom of religion on a global scale); see § 6401(a)(2) 
(“Freedom of religious belief and practice is a universal human right and fundamental 
freedom [. . .]”). 
88 Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87 (“But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged 
with finding their truth or falsity…they enter a forbidden domain.”). 
89 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”). Constitutional restraints that limit what 
the government can do rather than protect the rights of individual apply to citizens and 
noncitizens alike.  
The illegal aliens who are plaintiffs in these cases challenging the statute 
may claim the benefit of the Equal Protection Clause, which provides that 
no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is a 
person in any ordinary sense of that term. 
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The issue arises when asylum seekers’ fear of returning to their 
country of origin is grounded in a religious belief, and the judge, applying the 
objective prong of the well-founded fear standard, must determine whether 
the belief is objectively reasonable. This forces the judge to make a decision 
about the validity of the individual’s belief, because a belief that is considered 
to be absurd or implausible will not stand up in court as a reasonable fear. In 
these situations, an alternative standard is needed so judges are not forced 
into making a decision that is outside the scope of their jurisprudence.  
When adjudicating asylum claims with a religious-based fear, the 
application of the Ballard standard would prevent courts from inquiring into 
the objectivity of an applicant’s religious belief. This is consistent with 
precedent that the only determination courts should make regarding religious 
beliefs is whether they are sincerely held. Therefore, if applicants can show 
they truly fear returning to their home country, their fear should not be 
dismissed as unreasonable, even if it is based on a supernatural power, belief, 
or superstition. 
B. Difficulties That May Arise When Applying the Ballard Standard 
      Although it appears that this would dramatically lower the standard 
for asylum claims, showing well-founded fear is only one of many elements 
that an asylum seeker must prove in order to be granted asylum. Applicants 
still have to show that they would be persecuted on account of their race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a social group.90 As 
discussed below, lowering this standard would allow the court to spend more 
time on the areas that are most critical—such as the reason the applicant is 
being persecuted—instead of implementing a laborious, resource-intensive 
                                                            
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). 
90 As noted in In re Mogharrabi: 
It must also be remembered that an alien who succeeds in establishing a 
well-founded fear of persecution will not necessarily be granted asylum. 
He must also show that the feared persecution would be on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion. Thus, for example, aliens fearing retribution over purely 
personal matters, or aliens fleeing general conditions of violence and 
upheaval in their countries, would not qualify for asylum. Such persons 
may have well-founded fears, but such fears would not be on account of 
their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion. Finally, an applicant for asylum must also show that he 
merits the relief as a matter of discretion. 
In re Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 447 (BIA 1987) (internal citations omitted). 
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standard to decide the objectivity of an applicant’s fear. Moreover, the 
decision to grant asylum is ultimately one of discretion, so although the 
Ballard standard would provide guidance and ensure the judge’s analysis is 
in line with the Constitution, it would still be left to the judge’s discretion to 
decide whether or not to grant asylum.91 
Another argument against incorporating the Ballard standard is that 
it would further complicate the already problematic process of adjudicating 
religious asylum claims. Religious asylum claims pose a number of unique 
difficulties that make them more challenging than other asylum claims 
because of the limitations imposed on the court. Courts are restricted as to 
what evidence can be considered when deciding how the sincerity of an 
asylum seeker’s belief should be evaluated92 or how “orthodox” beliefs 
should be determined when adjudicating religious persecution claims.93 
Moreover, religious-based asylum claims tend to have even greater 
disparities than non-religious claims, exemplified by author Carolyn Blum’s 
finding that asylum seekers fleeing religious persecution from allied 
countries of the United States are less likely to obtain asylum than those 
fleeing religious persecution from countries that are considered enemies of 
the United States.94 Religious claims, which are inherently subjective, 
exemplify how bias can manifest in judicial decisions when the appropriate 
checks and balances are lacking. Adding the inability to evaluate the 
reasonableness of the asylum seeker’s belief would further complicate the 
                                                            
91 As noted in the Immigration and Nationality Act: 
The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may grant 
asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum in accordance with the 
requirements and procedures established by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security or the Attorney General under this section if the Secretary of 
Homeland Security or the Attorney General determines that such alien is 
a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A).  
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
92 See Michael Kagan, Refugee Credibility Assessment and the "Religious Imposter" 
Problem: A Case Study of Eritrean Pentecostal Claims in Egypt, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. 1179 (2010). 
93 Mejia-Paiz v. INS, 111 F.3d 720, 726 (9th Cir. 1996) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
IJ's personal belief that Jehovah's Witnesses do not swear under oath was an improper reason 
for doubting Mejia-Paiz's credibility.”). 
94 Carolyn Patty Blum, A Question of Values: Continuing Divergences Between U.S. and 
International Refugee Norms, 15 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 38, 43–44 (1997). 
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adjudicative process, a result that directly conflicts with the current 
administration’s goal of resolving asylum claims as quickly as possible.95  
C. How Applying the Ballard Standard Would Improve the Asylum 
Adjudication Process 
Even though the application of the Ballard standard may present some 
procedural concerns, the benefits of applying a standard that is consistent 
with other bodies of law and promotes the freedom of religion outweighs any 
potential negative impact. Applying the Ballard standard to asylum cases 
would ensure due process compliance, increase consistency between courts, 
enhance the efficiency and accuracy of the adjudication process, and ensure 
the protection of the constitutional right to freedom of religion.   
Although asylum seekers do not receive the same spectrum of rights 
as United States citizens, they are entitled to a fair hearing. The 5th 
Amendment entitles all people to the constitutional right of due process, both 
citizens and noncitizens alike.96 If asylum seekers, whose very lives are on 
                                                            
95  Asylum claims were intended to be adjudicated in 180 days, but an increasing backlog 
has slowed the process. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (1952) 
(directing the Attorney General to set procedural guidelines so asylum claims can be 
adjudicated in 180 days); see also Memorandum from EOIR Director James R. McHenry III, 
Guidance Regarding the Adjudication of Asylum Applications Consistent With INA § 
208(d)(5)(A)(iii)  1–2  (Nov.  19,  2018),     https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1112581 
/download (“[I]t is imperative that EOIR adopt sound strategies for handling asylum cases 
in a timely manner consistent with the intent of the Immigration and Nationality Act”. . . 
“[B]oth statutory provisions express Congress’s strong expectation that asylum applications 
would be adjudicated within 180 days of filing.”). The goal of expediting proceedings has 
become even more relevant under the current administration. See Memorandum from Tracy 
Short, Principal Legal Advisor, Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding the Implementation 
of the President’s Executive Orders and the Secretary’s Directives on Immigration 
Enforcement 2 (Aug. 15, 2017) (“The efficient litigation of proceedings before the 
Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is a key strategic 
priority of DHS.”) (citing Memorandum from John Kelly, Secretary of Homeland Security, 
Implementing the President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements 
Policies 6–7 (Feb. 20, 2017) (discussing the “unacceptable delay” in average processing 
times before the immigration courts)). 
96 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77–78 (1976) (Discussing the scope of the due process 
clause which extends even to aliens who are not here legally. “[A]ll persons, aliens and 
citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause . . . ”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No 
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”). 
This Court's prior cases recognizing that illegal aliens are “persons” 
protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, which Clauses do not include the phrase “within its 
jurisdiction,” cannot be distinguished on the asserted ground that persons 
who have entered the country illegally are not “within the jurisdiction” of 
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the line, do not have access to a fair and impartial hearing, they are not 
receiving the due process to which they are entitled.97 A limitation on judicial 
bias is critical for a fair trial that complies with the Due Process Clause. As 
stated by the Supreme Court in In Re Murchison “A fair trial in a fair tribunal 
is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence 
of actual bias in the trial of cases.”98 Given that uncurbed biases from the 
immigration judges significantly hinder the opportunity for a fair trial, there 
must be procedures in place to limit the effect of judicial bias. As Judge 
Bownes explains in Davis v. Page, a case dealing with the ability for students 
to leave the classroom when a classroom activity violated their religious 
beliefs, “a judge must strive not to allow his decision to be influenced by his 
personal appraisal of the claimed religious belief. Circumspection and 
objectivity are a judicial prerequisite.”99  
Applying the Ballard standard would provide this circumspection and 
objectivity. Shifting the focus from the highly subjective criteria of 
reasonableness to determinations that are more in line with objective criteria 
would help mitigate the issue of judicial bias, and thus work to ensure that 
asylum seekers’ due process rights are satisfied through access to an impartial 
trial.  
In addition to rectifying due process concerns, incorporating a clear 
standard such as the Ballard standard would mitigate some of the confusion 
surrounding the reasonable person standard derived from the objective prong 
of the well-founded fear test. While at present judges seem unsure of what 
constitutes a reasonable person, the Ballard standard would eliminate this 
issue by redirecting the focus to the asylum seeker themselves. The clear 
standard from Ballard ensures more consistent results. Especially when 
dealing with religious beliefs that a judge may not be intimately familiar with, 
                                                            
a State even if they are present within its boundaries and subject to its laws. 
Nor do the logic and history of the Fourteenth Amendment support such a 
construction. Instead, use of the phrase “within its jurisdiction” confirms 
the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection extends to 
anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and 
reaches into every corner of a State's territory. 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982). 
97 Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n alien who faces deportation is 
entitled to a full and fair hearing of his claims and a reasonable opportunity to present 
evidence on his behalf.”). 
98 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 
99 385 F.Supp. 395, 402 (D.N.H. 1974).  
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it is more likely that the judge can accurately determine whether an individual 
is truly afraid than whether the fear is objectively reasonable, or one that a 
reasonable person in the applicant’s situation would fear. This determination 
of credibility is typically made in every asylum hearing, both to satisfy the 
subjective prong of the well-founded fear test and to admit the individual’s 
testimony under the lower standard of evidence.100 Determining whether an 
applicant is sincere and honest is something that judges are accustomed to 
and capable of accurately deciding. Because this determination is already 
made, the Ballard standard would actually increase judicial efficiency by 
streamlining the asylum process. It stands to reason that applicants who are 
found to be credible are afraid when they say they are. Taking this assumption 
at face value eliminates the need for an in-depth analysis of the 
reasonableness of an applicant’s fear.  
Applying the Ballard standard would not only increase efficiency but 
also increase the chances that cases are accurately decided. Immigration 
judges operate under impossibly high quotas, forcing them to devote 
insufficient time to each case.101 The combination of a limited ability to 
prepare and conduct the case, as well as the fact that immigration judges do 
not have the requisite social, philosophical, and cultural backgrounds, makes 
applying the true reasonable person test impossible. A true understanding of 
what a reasonable person in the applicant’s situation would fear would 
require hours of research and preparation, something that is logistically 
impossible given the rate at which the judges must process cases. Allowing 
judges to expand on a prior finding of credibility and reduce the number of 
other requisite factual inquires would increase both the accuracy and the 
efficiency of the adjudication process.  
Most importantly, judges would not be forced into violating a 
constitutional tenant by determining the reasonableness of an individual’s 
belief.102 Evaluating the truthfulness of a religious belief has been termed a 
                                                            
100 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (1952) (“The testimony of 
the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant's burden without corroboration, but 
only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant's testimony is credible . . .”). 
101 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 2019 UPDATE REPORT, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION 
SYSTEM 20 (2019) (“With a backlog of 768,257 cases (as of the end of FY 2018) this amounts 
to approximately 1,851 backlog cases per immigration judge, an untenable level.”); see also 
AILA POLICY BRIEF, RESTORING INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE TO AMERICA’S 
IMMIGRATION COURTS (2018); Melnick, supra note 73. 
102 As articulated in Judge Ferguson’s dissenting opinion in Meija-Paiz v. INS: 
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forbidden domain for good reason. Allowing immigration judges to dismiss 
an asylum claim based on their disbelief of an individual’s religion requires 
a determination that a judge should never be permitted to make—the 
determination that a religious belief is not “reasonable.”103 Even when the 
reasonable person standard is properly applied, it fails to meet the 
constitutional protections implemented by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Ballard. When dealing with questions of religion, courts are strictly 
limited to analyzing the importance of the belief to the individual, and 
forbidden from analyzing the veracity of the belief itself.104 If these holdings 
applied in immigration court, the judges’ finding of credibility regarding the 
applicant’s subjective claim of fear should be enough to satisfy the well-
founded fear standard without conducting an objective analysis by 
adjudicating the reasonableness of the belief itself. 
The United States has long prioritized the protection of rights over the 
promotion of convenience, especially a right as significant as religious 
freedom. Constitutional tenets ought to be considered even if doing so will 
encumber the adjudication process, because the courts are the very bodies 
charged with protecting these rights. Clear precedent that outlines how these 
rights should be protected ought to be followed. In immigration court, 
reforming the well-founded fear standard to comply with these guidelines 
would not only promote the due process of asylum seekers, but also 
streamline and improve the overall asylum adjudication process. Although a 
standard has been developed over the years that attempts to take into account 
cultural and situational norms, that standard is still fundamentally flawed in 
that it requires the judge to make an unconstitutional determination. 
                                                            
A judge violates the First Amendment when he bases his decision not on 
objective facts but on his personal conclusions as a ‘lay theologian.’ 
Whether a person is a devout member of his church is not for the 
government to decide. It involves religious stereotyping that clouds all 
rational thinking. 
Mejia-Paiz v. INS, 111 F.3d 720, 729 (9th Cir. 1996) (Ferguson, J., dissenting). 
103 See, e.g., In re The Bible Speaks, 73 B.R. 848, 866 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) 
(“[A]djudication of his claim would necessarily involve inquiry into the reasonableness of 
those beliefs, an inquiry which the First Amendment forecloses.”) (citing Molko v. Holy 
Spirit Ass’n for the Unification of World Christianity, 179 Cal.App.3d 450 (1986)). 
104 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (“But if those doctrines are subject to 
trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity…they enter a forbidden 
domain.”). 
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CONCLUSION – MOVING FORWARD & LOOKING BACK 
In the event that the Ballard standard were implemented, limiting the 
judicial inquiry into the objective prong of the well-founded fear test, would 
the outcomes be different for any of the hypotheticals presented in the 
introduction? Although impossible to say for certain, the answer is likely yes. 
The Ballard standard would prevent these cases from being dismissed merely 
because the judge was unfamiliar with, or biased against, these types of 
unfamiliar religious beliefs.  
Take, for example, the hypothetical of Adija, who believes that if she 
returns to Nigeria she will be killed by the Ogboni. In court, she argues that 
she cannot safely live anywhere in Nigeria, because no matter where she goes 
the Ogboni will know where she is and how to find her. She explains that her 
life will be in even greater danger now that she has told the court about the 
Ogboni—merely mentioning their name is punishable by death. When asked 
how the Ogboni will know that she has sought asylum in the United States 
and revealed details of their practice, she says that they are using their powers 
to watch her, right now, as she testifies.  
From a Western perspective, or for anyone outside of this specific set 
of religious beliefs, these beliefs would be dismissed as unreasonable. 
Applying a vague standard of reasonableness would almost surely result in 
the dismissal of her claim. Applying the slightly higher reasonable person 
standard presents a number of practical difficulties. If Adija represents 
herself, as most asylum applicants do,105 how will she convince the judge that 
these beliefs are prevalent in her community? Even if represented by an 
attorney who has the time and resources to prepare extensive academic 
evidence documenting the existence of the Ogboni and the general prevalence 
of fear towards them throughout Nigeria, will the judge have the opportunity 
to thoroughly review this evidence and give it the weight it deserves? Should 
immigration judges be making decisions on what a reasonable Nigerian 
national may or may not fear? 
  These same issues are raised in the other two hypotheticals. In the 
case of Adebisi, how is an immigration judge to know whether it was 
reasonable for him to be afraid to go to the police without conducting hours 
                                                            
105 See Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas 
for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 739 (2002) (“At the affirmative application stage, only 
one in three applicants is aided by representation.”). 
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of research on the religious beliefs of the Esubete people? In cases that 
challenge the very notion of what constitutes a religion, such as Edionseri’s 
belief that he would be accused of being possessed by demons, the 
immigration judge would have to try and figure out who would be a 
reasonable person in Edionseri’s position. The idea that the immigration 
judge would consider what a “reasonable person from Nigeria who is 
believed to be possessed by demons” would fear seems outlandish, but this is 
the very standard that ought to be applied under current case law. Of course, 
because of the difficulty in applying the reasonable person test, the case law 
has eroded over time to the broad standard of objective reasonableness, a 
standard that requires great judicial discretion and thus brings inconsistent 
results.  
The application of the Ballard standard mitigates these issues. The 
ability of the immigration judge to dismiss the case on the basis that Adija is 
unreasonable is eliminated, focusing the analysis instead on Adija’s 
subjective fear. Is she afraid? If so, then the case moves on to the many other 
elements that she must prove in order to be granted asylum: she would 
experience future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, and her case 
merits the judge’s discretionary approval. These claims are not easy to prove, 
but the judge would be able to devote more time adjudicating these other, 
truly objective standards with time that would otherwise be spent settling the 
issue of well-founded fear. 
     In conclusion, the best way to resolve the current issues with 
adjudicating a well-founded fear is to implement the Ballard standard so that 
immigration judges are not evaluating the reasonableness of an asylum 
seeker’s religious belief. Instead of dismissing religious beliefs as 
unreasonable, immigration judges should instead focus on adjudicating 
whether applicants for asylum are sincere in their beliefs. This approach is 
consistent with precedent from the Supreme Court and the high value placed 
on protecting freedom of religion.  
